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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are collections of mobile nodes that can communicate with one an-
other using multihop wireless links. MANETs are often deployed in the environments, where there is no 
fixed infrastructure and centralized management. The nodes of mobile ad hoc networks are susceptible to 
compromise. In such a scenario, designing an efficient, reliable and secure routing protocol has been a 
major challengesue over the last many years. The routing protocol Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) has no security measures in-built in it. It is vulnerable to many types of routing attacks. The flood 
attack is one of them. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective technique to secure Ad hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol against flood attacks. To deal with a flood attack, we 
have proposed Neighbor Defense Technique for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (NDTAODV). This 
makes AODV more robust. The proposed technique has been designed to isolate the flood attacker with the 
use of timers, peak value and hello alarm technique. 
 
We have simulated our work in Network Simulator NS-2.33 (NS-2) with different pause times by way of 
different number of malicious nodes. We have compared the performance of NDTAODV with the AODV in 
normal situation as well as  in the presence of malicious attacks. We have considered Packet Delivery 
Fraction (PDF), Average Throughput (AT) and Normalized Routing Load (NRL) for comparing the per-
formance of NDTAODV and AODV. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobile ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are collections of wireless mobile nodes, dynamically form-
ing a temporary network without the use of any pre-defined network infrastructure or centralized 
administration. The functional challenge in the design of ad hoc networks is the development of 
dynamic routing protocols that can efficiently find routes between two communicating nodes. The 
routing protocol must be able to keep up with the high degree of node mobility that often changes 
the network topology drastically and unpredictably [1]. 
 
Many types of routing protocols in MANETs have been proposed and these protocols can be clas-
sified into the three categories: Table-driven (or Proactive), on-demand (or Reactive) and Zone 
based (or Hybrid). Many experiments have been done to find the best protocol out of the available 
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protocols. Almost all experiments lead to the most used and reliable protocol namely Ad hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV), which is a reactive routing protocol. But the AODV protocol 
has no security measures in-built in it. Thus, it is vulnerable to many types of attacks. 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate that the flood attack is possible in AODV routing protocol and pro-
pose techniques to provide security for preventing flood attacks. Our paper is divided into several 
sections as follows:  Section 2 describes the fundamental working of AODV. In section 3, a de-
scription of the flooding attack is given. Section 4 discusses the attacker’s approach in a flooding 
attack. Section 5 describes the previous work in this area. Section 6 provides complete under-
standing of our proposed algorithm - Neighbor Defense Technique for AODV (NDTAODV). 
Section 7 and 8 provide the simulation set up and result analysis respectively. We have concluded 
this paper in Section 9 followed by the references of our research work. 
 
2. FUNDAMENTAL   WORKING    OF  AODV 
 
AODV routing protocol is an on-demand routing protocol where the route is established on de-
mand. These kind of routing protocols compute the route to a specific destination only when it is 
needed. So a routing table, containing all the nodes as entries, does not have to be maintained in 
each node. When a source wants to send a packet to a destination, it invokes a route discovery 
mechanism to find the path to the destination. The route remains valid till the destination is reach-
able or until the route is no longer needed. 
 
AODV consists of two processes- Route Discovery (use of RREQ and RREP) and Route Mainte-
nance (use of RERR and HELLO). Figure 1 depicts the process of Route Discovery [3]. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Fundamental Route Discovery Process in AODV 
 
In AODV, route discovery is entirely on-demand. When a source node needs to send packets to a 
destination, for which it has no available route, it broadcasts a RREQ (Route Request) packet to 
its neighbors. Each node maintains a monotonically increasing sequence number to ensure loop 
free routing and supersedes stale route cache. The source node includes the known sequence 
number of the destination in the RREQ packet [3]. The intermediate node, receiving a RREQ 
packet, checks its route table entries. If it possesses a route toward the destination with a greater 
sequence number than that in the RREQ packet, it unicasts a RREP (Route Reply) packet back to 
its neighbor from which it received the RREQ packet. Otherwise, it sets up the reverse path and 
then rebroadcasts the RREQ packet. Duplicate RREQ packets received by one node are silently 
dropped. This way, the RREQ packet is flooded in a controlled manner in the network, and it will 
eventually arrive at the destination itself or at a node that can supply a fresh route to the destina-
tion, which will generate the RREP packet. As the RREP packet is propagated along the reverse 
path to the source, the intermediate nodes update their routing tables, with an additional constraint 
on the sequence number, and set up the forward path. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.6, No.1, January 2014 
 
21 
 
AODV also includes the route maintenance mechanism to handle the dynamics in the network 
topology. Link failures can be detected by either periodic beacons or link layer acknowledgments, 
such as those provided by 802.11 MAC protocol [3]. Once a link is broken, an unsolicited RRER 
packet with a fresh sequence number and infinite hop count is propagated to all active source 
nodes that are currently using this link. When the source node receives the notification of a bro-
ken link, it may restart the path discovery process if it still needs a route to the destination. 
 
3. FLOODING ATTACK IN MANET 
 
The malicious node(s) can attack in MANET using different ways, such as sending fake messages 
several times, fake routing information, and advertising fake links to disrupt routing operations 
[4]. In the following subsection, current routing attacks and its countermeasures against MANET 
protocols are discussed in brief. 
 
3.1 Flooding Attack w.r.t to AODV  
 
In flooding attacks, an attacker exhausts the network resources, such as bandwidth and to con-
sume a node’s resources e.g. computational and battery power or to disrupt the routing operation 
to cause severe degradation in network performance. In AODV protocol, a malicious node can 
send a large number of RREQs in a short period to a destination node that does not exist in the 
network. Because no one will reply to the RREQs, these RREQs will flood the whole network. As 
a result, all of the node battery power, as well as network bandwidth will be consumed and could 
lead to denial-of-service to other users. 
 
4. ATTACKER APPROACH TO FLOOD THE NETWORK 
 
The networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service (DOS) attacks launched through 
compromised nodes or intruders. The new DOS attack, called Ad Hoc Flooding Attack can result 
in denial of service when used against on-demand routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks, 
such as AODV/Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR). The intruder broadcasts mass Route 
Request packets to exhaust the communication bandwidth and resources of nodes so that valid 
communication between nodes cannot be sustained. The injected packet is a fake packet. The 
attacker node puts its own define value in RREQ packet in order to make this attack more dan-
gerous. 
 
Flooding RREQ packets in the whole network will consume a lot of resources of the network. To 
reduce congestion in a network, the AODV protocol adopts the following method: It limits the 
number of messages,t originating from a node to RREQ_RATELIMIT RREQ messages per sec-
ond. After broadcasting a RREQ, a node waits for a RREP. If a route is not received within 
round-trip milliseconds, the node may try again to discover a route by broadcasting another 
RREQ, up to a maximum of retry times at the maximum TTL value. In the Flooding Attack, the 
attack node violates the above rules to exhaust the network resource. 
 
First, the attacker selects many IP addresses which are not in the network, if the attacker knows 
the scope of IP address in the networks. Because none of the nodes can answer RREP packets for 
these RREQ, the reverse route in the route table of node will be conserved  longer. The attacker 
can select random IP addresses if it doesnot know the scope of IP addresses. 
 
Secondly, the attacker successively originates mass RREQ messages for these void IP addresses. 
The attacker tries to send excessive RREQ without considering Request rate limit per second. The 
attacker will resend the RREQ packets without waiting for the RREP or round-trip time, if it uses 
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out these IP addresses. The TTL of RREQ is set up to a maximum without using expanding ring 
search method. In the Flooding Attacks, the whole network will be full of RREQ packets which 
the attacker sends. The communication bandwidth is exhausted by the flooded RREQ packets and 
the resources of nodes are exhausted at the same time. For example, the storage of the route table 
is limited. If mass RREQ packets are coming to a node in a short time interval, the storage of 
route table in the node will be exhausted, so that the node would not be able to receive new 
RREQ packets. As a result, a legitimate nodes willnot be able to set up paths to send data. Figure 
2 shows an example of RREQ Flooding Attack. Node 8 is an attacker and floods mass RREQ 
packets over the networks so that the other nodes cannot build paths with one another. 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2. The Flooding Attack 
5. PREVIOUS WORK 
 
In [4] Rashid Hafeez Khokhar, Md Asri Ngadi and Satria Mandala reviewed routing attacks in 
MANETs. They have discussed various types of routing protocols and different kinds of possible 
attacks. 
 
In [5] Ping Yi, Zhoulin Dai, Shiyong Zhang and Yiping Zhong proposed an approach to prevent 
flood attack and also compared Ad Hoc Flooding Attack and SYN Flooding Attack in AODV. 
Their results show that the packet delivery ratio becomes better compared to the one in original 
AODV. 
 
In [6] Revathi Venkataraman, M. Pushpalatha, and T. Rama Rao proposed an algorithm to pre-
vent flood attack. They define different trust levels for the neighbor, like a friend is most trusted, 
an acquaintances is less trusted and a stranger is least trusted or falls in the category of dangerous 
in terms of flood attack. 
 
In [11] Akshai Aggarwal, Savita Gandhi etc, proposed AODVSEC wherein, they have modified 
the fundamental route discovery process of the basic AODV in such a way that the protocol can 
mitigate the effects of active forge attacks viz. Resource Consumption (RC) attack, Route Disturb 
(RD) attack and Route Invasion (RI) attack through fake RREP message. To provide the security 
provision, AODVSEC does not use cryptography or any central trusted authority, which may 
require a great deal of computational power. Performance of AODVSEC is no less than that of 
the SAODV but the same is achieved with lower processing requirement leading to saving of 
computational power. They have further proposed to focus on security aspects for the attacks that 
can be launched through forging the RREQ control message. 
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6. ALGORITHM    FOR    NEIGHBOR DEFENSE TECHNIQUE TO MITIGATE 
FLOOD ATTACK (NDT) 
 
Flooding attack is very dangerous as far as MANET’s performance is concerned. Such an attack 
adversely affects battery life and leads to congestion in the network. In this type of attack, re-
quester (Attacker) floods the network with unnecessary RREQ packets. This can result into denial 
of service attack, as intermediate nodes have to do extra work to forward these fake packets. Thus 
the nodes may not be able to do other useful work and may not be able to involve itself in other 
operations. In our proposed algorithm, Broody list table and RREQ_count table are maintained by 
every node. 
 
6.1 Broody list: 
 
This table will keep the record for malicious node which floods the request. Flood Timer has tak-
en for generating Dummy packet by the attackers. Every nodes maintain this table and keep the 
entries for those who are intruders. 
 
Table 1. Broody List 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 RREQ_count table: 
 
This table keeps track of the number of request come from each neighbor and     expiry value as 
timestamp in the particular interval. The Cache Timer will trigger the event for flushing the 
RREQ_count and check for the number of request comes from a neighbor if it is exceed the 
peak_value (that is the threshold value, which can be decided according to the network density), 
then it will place the requester in Broody list (dark-list) and will not allow requesters packet for 
broadcasting  
 
       Table 2.  RREQ_count 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malicious node 1 id 
Malicious node 2 id 
Malicious node 3 id 
RREQ_ID RREQentry TimeStamp 
Requester1 Id 5 0.34566 
Requester2 Id 1 0.55346 
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6.3 NDT Algorithm : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 3. The Neighbour Defence Technique (NDT) algorithm 
 
Following are the Prerequisites and assumptions of NDTAODV: 
 
As the detection can only done by the very neighbor of the attacker, enabling the HELLO packet 
of nodes will be required. 
 
Peak_value, Cache interval and Flood interval should be synchronize with each other according to 
the nature  of the MANET. 
 
No other legitimate node sends more than 10 requests per second as they have to follows the 
AODV constraint. Attacker should be an outsider and so that it cannot block other nodes by enter-
ing other legitimate nodes in its broody list. 
 
6.4  HAT (Hello Alarm technique for global notification): 
 
In our work, we use  the Hello alarm technique (HAT)  for notification to other nodes in the net-
work about existence of the malicious node. Our proposed algorithm utilizes the HELLO packet 
to transmit the entire Broody list to other legitimate nodes. Send hello and receive hello processes 
are used for retrieving and storing the malicious list from the packet. 
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Figure 4.  The Hello Alarm Technique (HAT) algorithm 
 
7 SIMULATION SETUP 
 
 
This section provides the simulation setup for comparing the performance of NDTAODV with 
the existing normal AODV using Network Simulator – 2.33 (NS-2) [7] [8]. The details of the 
timers and performance metrics are give in the following subsections. Table 3 shows details of 
simulation set up. 
 
       Table 2. Experimental Setup 
 
Parameter Parameter Values 
Simulator NS-2.33 
Simulation time 100 Second 
Number of nodes 25 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.6, No.1, January 2014 
 
26 
Routing Protocol AODV, NDTAODV 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) 
No. of sources/connections 5 
Terrain area 1000 m X 1000 m 
Mobility Model Random Waypoint 
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11 
Antenna Type Omni directional antenna 
Propagation Model Two Ray Ground 
Packet Size 512 byte 
Pause Time 0,5,10,15,20 ms 
Number of Malicious 
Nodes 
1,3 
Flood Interval 0.009 Second 
Cache Interval 1 Second 
Peak Value 10 (Number of request) 
Entry Expiry Time CURRENT_TIME+1 
 
7.1 Timers 
 
Timers are default component in the AODV protocol. It will triggers specific event or function 
according to the timer value.  The proposed algorithm two function constantly working SEND-
fakerequest and ct_flush for floodTimer and cacheTimer respectively. 
 
FloodTimer: In order to inject FAKE Request packet by a malicious node in the MANETs, Pro-
posed scheme used flood timer which continuously sends the request packet as the value 0.009 
second. Every 0.0009 second attacker broadcast the request packet in the network. 
 
CacheTimer: In order to observe Request table entry for the expire time and request count entry 
for the requester to check whether it exceeds peak (Threshold) or not. The CacheTimer value set 
as 1. 
 
7.2 Performance Metrics 
 
Following   three performance metrics are considered   in   our   work: 
 
(a) Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): This is the ratio of the number of data packets successfully 
delivered to the destinations to those generated by sources. 
(b) Average Throughput(AT): It is the rate of successfully transmitted data packets in a unit 
time in the network during the simulation. 
(c) Normalized Routing Load (NRL): The number of routing packets transmitted per data 
packet delivered at the destination. 
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8 RESULT ANALYSIS 
 
This section discusses result of our experimental setup for three different cases. In this experi-
mental work, we have considered network size of 25 nodes including 1 malicious node and five 
connections. Figures 5, 6 and 7 are the comparison graphs of PDF, Average Throughput and NRL 
vs Pause Time respectively. Different pause time means different mobility and pause time zero 
designated the highest mobility of nodes. 
 
8.1 With flood attack for 1 malicious node 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. PDF vs PauseTime 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average Throughput vs PauseTime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. NRL vs PauseTime 
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Figure 5 describe that our work NDTAODV has   better packet delivery ratio than the normal 
AODV in the presence of flooding attack. Figure 6 show that the average throughput of 
NDTAODV is higher as compare to the original AODV and it continuously increased when the 
pause time increases in both the protocol. It is observed in the figure 7 that the normalized routing 
load (NRL) of NDTAODV is very much lower as compared to that of AODV 
8.2 With   flood   attack   for  3   malicious node 
In this experimental work, we have considered network size of 25 nodes including 3 malicious 
node and five connections. Figures 8, 9 and 10 are the comparison graphs of PDF, Average 
Throughput and NRL vs Pause Time respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 8. PDF vs PauseTime 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average Throughput vs PauseTime 
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Figure 10. NRL vs PauseTime 
 
Figure 8 shows that the PDF of NDTAODV is better even in the presence of three malicious 
nodes than that of  normal AODV as long as mobility is not high. The performance of 
NDTAODV is reduced in high mobility (zero pause time) compared to the original AODV. 
 
From the figure 9, we observe that the throughput of NDTAODV is less in high mobility com-
pared to that of  AODV but the throughput of our algorithm increased as and when pause time 
increased. 
 
From Figure 10, we observe that NDTAODV and AODV both are having the same NRL in the 
high mobility. Further NRL of our proposed algorithm is continuously improved when the pause 
time is increased. 
 
8.3   Without Flood attack under normal conditions 
 
Following are the figures for comparison of Neighbor Defense Technique AODV (NDTAODV) 
and simple AODV in normal situation without any flood attack. We have taken a network of 25 
nodes with five connection patterns. Figures 11, 12 and 13 represent the graphs of PDF, Average 
Throughput and NRL vs Pause Time respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. PDF vs PauseTime 
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 Figure 12. Average Throughput vs PauseTime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. NRL vs PauseTime 
 
From Figure 11, we observe that if no malicious node is present, then the PDF of our proposed 
algorithm NDTAODV is less compare to the PDF for the normal AODV in high speed mobility 
but after pause time of 15, our algorithm show a dynamic enhancement in the PDF continuously. 
As a result, we can conclude that NDTAODV works better for the military tank/application where 
mobility is less. 
 
From Figure 12, we observe that in the absence of malicious activity, the throughput of our algo-
rithm NDTAODV is less compared to that of the normal AODV for high mobility but after pause 
time 15, enhancement in throughput in NDTAODV is observed at a fast rate. 
 
From Figure 13, we observe that the NRL of NDTAODV is higher compare to that of the normal 
AODV in high mobility but after pause time 15, NDTAODV  has less routing load. 
 
9  CONCLUSION 
 
Security is an important aspect for deployment of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. The route discovery 
process in the AODV is extremely susceptible to RREQ flooding attack, hence, it is imperative to 
provide an efficient security mechanism to mitigate the effect of such attacks. In this   paper, we 
propose an effective mechanism NDTAODV to provide security against RREQ flooding attacks 
in existing AODV routing protocol to establish a secure route for communication. 
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Using simulation results, the performance of NDTAODV is analyzed against RREQ flooding 
attack and justified. Our results show that the attacks have a great effect on the network        per-
formance and NDTAODV efficiently detects and isolate the malicious nodes from the active 
route to make the network available. Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF) of NDTAODV improve and 
Average Throughput (AT) which is the most important aspect of protocol is maintained as the 
pause time increase while AODV performance drops significantly under the presence of flood 
attack.  So, performance of NDTAODV is better in the presence of attacks whereas    normal 
AODV perform better in the absence of flooding attack when mobility increases. As a    future 
work, we intend to incorporate the proposed scheme for presence of other type of attacks like 
greyhole attack, blackhole attack and wormhole attack which many affect the network perform-
ance. 
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